The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

STUDY PROJECT

USSOCOM SUPPORT FOR COUNTER NARCOTICS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROY R. TRUMBLE
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1991

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

91-00614

Unclassified
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Unclassified

1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS

2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)

5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)

6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
U.S. Army War College

6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)

7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION

6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)

8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION

8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)

9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)

10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS

PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)
USSOCOM Support for Counter Narcotics

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Trumble, Roy R., LTC, USA

13a. TYPE OF REPORT	13b. TIME COVERED	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)	15. PAGE COUNT
Final	FROM _____ TO _____	1991 March 21	34

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

The Department of Defense has assumed a greater role in efforts to fight the drug war. USSOCOM elements play a major role in these operations. Yet there still is neither clearly defined military strategy nor adequate operationalization of the efforts in the field. An evaluation of past and present roles that Special Operations Forces play in the war against drugs reveals a relatively ineffective campaign. Considering current SOF doctrine and organization, legal and ethical parameters, and DoD guidance, there are major changes required to enhance effectiveness of law enforcement and interdiction, to fulfill the command-and-control requirements and clarify the mission. USSOCOM has the capacity to take on a much greater role than it now shoulders. If USSOCOM is to participate in the "war" on drugs, then it must become more than an equipment and personnel pool for civilian law enforcement. It must fight to win.

20 DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT ☐ DTIC USERS

21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Unclassified

22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL	22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL
Mr. D. H. Dearth	(717) 245-3191	AWCD

DD Form 1473, JUN 86 *Previous editions are obsolete.* SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

USSOCOM SUPPORT FOR COUNTER NARCOTICS

by

Lieutenant Colonel Roy R. Trumble
United States Army

Douglas H. Dearth
Project Advisor

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Roy R. Trumble, Ltc. USA
TITLE: USSOCOM Support for Counter Narcotics
FORMAT: Individual Study Project
DATE: 21 March 1991 PAGES: 34 Unclassified

The Department of Defense has assumed a greater role in efforts to fight the drug war. USSOCOM elements play a major role in these operations. Yet there still is neither clearly defined military strategy nor adequate operationalization of the efforts in the field. An evaluation of past and present roles that Special Operations Forces play in the war against drugs reveals a relatively ineffective campaign. Considering current SOF doctrine and organization, legal and ethical parameters, and DoD guidance, there are major changes required to enhance effectiveness of law enforcement and interdiction, to fulfill the command-and-control requirements and clarify the mission. USSOCOM has the capacity to take on a much greater role than it now shoulders. If USSOCOM is to participate in the "war" on drugs, then it must become more than an equipment and personnel pool for civilian law enforcement. It must fight to win.

Accession For
NTIS GRA&I ☑
DTIC TAB ☐
Unannounced ☐
Justification
By
Distribution/
Availability Codes
Dist | Avail and/or Special
A-1

INTRODUCTION

Is there a role for the Department of Defense and its Special Operations Forces in the fight against illegal drug use? Recent public opinion would indicate that there is. Congress, responding to election year pressure, in 1988 voted overwhelmingly to expand the military's role in counternarcotics efforts.[1]

The extensive use of mind altering drugs in the United States includes the use of heroin, methamphetamines, marijuana, designer or high tech/artificial drugs like "crank" and "ice," as well as alcohol and tobacco. Next to alcohol, cocaine and its derivatives have become the drug of choice.[2] The use of cocaine in powder or "free-based" or in its most addictive form, smoked as "crack," poses two types of threats to national security. The first is the threat to individual users. The adverse physiological and psychological effects harm not only physical health but rational thinking and decision making ability.[3] The use of these drugs has permeated almost every level of society including the health professions, legal and law enforcement agencies and high elected officials.

As if the effects of drugs on individuals were not devastating enough, the adverse societal effects are even more threatening. Wide ranging and extensive distribution nets have spread the use of illegal drugs from inner city poor to middle

class suburbia and even to the most remote rural areas. Along with the expansion in drug usage has come an escalation in associated violent crime.[4] Some sources claim that up to 75% of reported robberies and 50% of felonious assaults are drug related. Drug related crime can take on several forms:

(1) Production, sale, purchase or consumption of illicit drugs;

(2) Drug user's crime - robbery, burglary, prostitution-crimes to pay for their addiction;

(3) Violent/crazed crime caused by drug use;

(4) Violent crime between competing drug traffickers.[5]

There has also been a clear correlation established between high incidence of individual drug use and high criminality rates.[6] An official from the Office of National Drug Control Policy, estimates that 35% to 40% of all prison inmates in the United States are incarcerated because of "drug related" crimes.[7] This significant increase in violence, along with the inability of the law enforcement and legal systems to cope with the magnitude of the problem, threatens the very legitimacy and authority of society. Political leaders, faced with what is viewed as a serious threat to our traditional values and to the "American" way of life, have been under tremendous political pressure to do something. They have considered options ranging from decriminalization or legalization of drug usage to declaring a "war" on drugs and using the military.[8]

The use of the United States military in combatting illegal drugs has been a controversial subject for more than a decade.[9] In 1981, the first legislation was passed that would enable the limited use of military forces in support of law enforcement agencies. Since then the controversy has raged not only in the public sector but within the military as well. The purposes of this paper are to examine that controversy, to determine whether the use of Special Operations Forces to reduce drug entry into the United States is a strategically viable concept, and to offer recommendations on the future role for the United States Special Operations Command.

THE CONTROVERSY

The evolution of the Department of Defense involvement in countering narcotics use and drug trafficking can be traced directly to the Defense Authorization Act passed by Congress in 1981. Prior to its passage, the military establishment had been prevented from participation in police and domestic law enforcement by the Posse Comitatus Act. This Act was passed by Congress in 1878 in reaction to the abuses by the military in enforcing martial law in the South following the Civil War. It is generally accepted that its passage brought to a close the Reconstruction Era. Since then the military has only been employed in law enforcement during times of national crisis. Federalized National Guard and regular army troops were used as

strikebreakers in the 1920's and 1940's, and they were called upon to disperse World War I army veterans during the 1932 "Bonus Army" demonstrations in Washington D.C. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy again used the military during the 1950's and early 1960's to enforce integration laws, while active duty soldiers were used by Presidents Johnson and Nixon to quell civil disturbances during the turbulent 1960's and early 1970's.[10]

Drug abuse became a major political issue during President Carter's Administration. During the Presidential campaign in 1980, both candidates promised to take decisive action to eradicate the problem. Following his election, President Reagan pushed for legislation that would allow the use of Department of Defense forces to assist civilian law enforcement agencies. On December 1, 1981 Congress passed Public Law 97-86, the annual defense appropriation bill, which in effect amended the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.[11] Its purpose was to clear the way legally to permit the use of military forces to provide specified support to federal agencies. This support was limited to the following:

(1) Providing information collected during the normal course of military operations;

(2) Using military equipment and facilities;

(3) Training and advising civilian law enforcement officials;

(4) Operating and maintaining the military equipment provided.

The Department of Defense was authorized to provide this same support to overseas efforts as well as in the United States. There were some very clear limitations to this support. This assistance could not be provided if it interfered with military readiness or preparedness. The law further prevented direct participation by military personnel "in an interdiction of a vessel or aircraft, a search and seizure, arrest or similar activity."[12] Since the passage of this law in 1981, the Department of Defense's role in drug law enforcement has expanded greatly. It has expanded not only in the amount of support it provides, but it has expanded into a leading role in policy development and direction. This expansion has included support from all services. It has included both the active and reserve components, and its role has been extended to providing support to foreign governments and to training and operational support for law enforcement agencies in the United States.[13]

When President Reagan signed into law the Fiscal Year 1989 National Defense Authorization Act, it funded and tasked DoD with a number of drug interdiction and counterdrug activities. More importantly it designated the Department of Defense as the "lead" agency for air and sea surveillance, monitoring andinterdiction. The new law also gave the Secretary the authority to approve

military support overseas and in the states and to use both active duty and reserve components to carry out that support. Probably the most significant sections of the law dealt with requirements for the Secretary of Defense to report directly to Congress on the status of DoD's implementation of its provisions. It further tasked DoD to provide additional comment on the feasibility of numerous other initiatives, ranging from detailing officers from the Judge Advocate General Corps to the Department of Justice, to the use of Special Operations Forces in drug interdiction. In addition, the Secretary has been tasked to give Congress a detailed after action report each year.[14]

The requirement for the Department of Defense to report directly to Congress is significant in that it highlights the controversy that has placed a reluctant military and an impatient Congress on opposing sides. That debate is over the use of military forces in a fight against what is seen as a purely domestic law enforcement issue.

THE DEBATE

The decision to use military forces to combat drug activities resulted from a greater debate that has embroiled the Department of State and the Department of Defense since the beginning of 1980. Led by Secretary George Shultz, the State Department assumed an extremely "hawkish" stance as it demonstrated a willingness to employ military power as a key

element of diplomacy. Critical of what he felt was the Defense Department's reluctance to use its power, especially in light of the great expense it cost American taxpayers, Secretary Shultz took a consistent hard-line approach, whether dealing with terrorism or drug interdiction or with what has become known as the Weinberger Doctrine.[15]

The Weinberger Doctrine evolved from a speech given by Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger to the National Press Club in 1984. In the speech, he was critical of those who would use military force as the first choice among the elements of power. Outlining six tests or conditions that had to be met before committing United States forces abroad, Secretary Weinberger was attempting to save the military from "no win" war policies such as we had in Vietnam. This doctrine was widely attacked by the Congress, by the press and by the public. It was embraced by the military whose senior leadership was seeking to establish clear, strategic parameters for the use of force. To the military leadership it was concise, to the point, and relatively risk free. It was soon used to embrace any involvement by the military, in domestic affairs as well as foreign. Even after Weinberger's resignation, his philosophy remained a factor in military decision making, and it is still today presented as a consideration in strategy development at the Army War College.

Given President Bush's guidance to the Secretary of Defense in the 1990 National Security Strategy and a Congressional mandate (in the way of a defense appropriation bill), an evaluation of Weinberger's Doctrine as it pertains to the war on

drugs might seem pointless. However, it still is useful to note the parameters of the doctrine and to use them as a frame of reference when evaluating the military's role in counternarcotics.

According to Weinberger we should commit forces only when the following rules have been met:

(1) A vital national interest is at stake;

(2) Sufficient forces are committed to win;

(3) Clearly defined political and military objectives have been established;

(4) Adjustment of forces is permitted once committed;

(5) Reasonable assurance of congressional and public support is expected;

(6) Military forces are committed only as a last resort.[16]

Using these guidelines, can an evaluation be made to determine whether or not the use of military force been justified? First and foremost does the drug problem threaten a "vital" interest? Even President Bush in his 1990 National Security Strategy fails to consider illicit drug use as anything more than just a "threat" to our national security interest. It does not matter that passionate pleas citing the costs in wasted human lives is valid. It does not matter that the threats to political stability at home and abroad are serious. It does not

matter that the fiscal burden for law enforcement is enormous. None of these things in and of themselves, justify military commitment according to Weinberger. Only a statement from the President declaring that a "vital" interest of the United States is at risk, will satisfy this requirement.

Have adequate forces been committed to win? While the amount of military support and the number of troops involved in counternarcotic activities has increased significantly, forces are being committed in piecemeal fashion without centralized direction or control. But how many forces would be enough? No one knows for sure.

One of the reasons for this is that the counternarcotics strategy lacks clearly defined political and military objectives. What is our national goal: to stop illegal drug use by American citizens or to stop Bolivian farmers from growing coca leaf or to stop international cocaine smugglers?

Once committed, is the military allowed to reassess and make adjustments to its forces? As a support agency, DoD has little to say about the level of its force commitments. In the absence of definitive political and military objectives, the Defense Department cannot determine the size force required. Steady increases in military funding and support would indicate that this guideline has been partially met. However, DoD has yet to attempt to decrease its commitment or to withdraw from the fight.

Weinberger also felt that the military establishment should have a "reasonable assurance" that the public was in favor of and

would support its actions. This response is almost impossible to predict and given the capricious nature of the Congress and of the American people, impossible to maintain. On the other hand, there has been no widespread public opposition to military involvement in the drug war.

Weinberger's final rule is perhaps the most important and that is that the military use of force should only be called upon after all other elements of power have been exercised. An evaluation of the government's efforts in education, rehabilitation, criminal prosecution, foreign diplomacy, etc., is beyond the scope of this paper. However there are enough critics of the ongoing policies to make it safe to say that it is in this final rule that the justification for the use of the military in counternarcotics operations fails most conspicuously.

According to Weinberger's parameters, the employment of military force in counternarcotics would be to commit it to an unsupportable, unwinnable conflict. There also are serious doubts about the military's ability to have any influence on the national drug scene outside of its own internal antidrug efforts.

While each of these tests could be taken, evaluated, and used as a standard, there is no longer open opposition in the military as it relates to the drug war. The Army, for instance, has assumed the following position:

> Illicit drugs threaten the national security of the United States, our basic values, and institutions. Countering drug production, trafficking, and use is a

high-priority national security mission of the Department of Defense and the United States Army. Congressional legislation and policy statements by the President and the Secretary of Defense have resulted in an expanded role for the Nation's Armed Forces in halting the flow and production of drugs at the source, in transit, and within the continental United States.[17]

Following his resignation, Weinberger made the following parting shots concerning efforts to use the military to stop illicit drug trade. Agreeing that drug abuse and the criminal activity surrounding it are serious threats to national security he offered the following:

(1) The drug crisis is not a military threat. Many national security threats are best met by political, economic and diplomatic initiatives.

(2) Military efforts will have only modest success. Even by completely shutting down our borders (which is impractical) we will not stop drug traffic as long as Americans are willing to pay for illicit drugs. The only sure way to stop drugs is to eliminate the demand.

(3) An expanded military role will have undesirable political ramifications. It is against our Constitutional traditions to use soldiers as policemen or to do such things as conduct domestic surveillance. Popular support will inevitably disappear.[18]

Weinberger added that the military can be used effectively in a limited manner. This assistance would consist of direct support to law enforcement agencies in the areas of intelligence, communication, training, and command-and-control. Direct support to other nations similar to Operation Blast Furnace in 1986 in Bolivia would also be appropriate. Even in the arena of limited support, a clear military objective must be forthcoming.

Concluding, the Secretary warned that the military "is not a magic cure for this cancer that infects our nation and other nations. The solution must be found within ourselves."[19]

In spite of these warnings and opposition by successive Defense Department chiefs, Congress has enacted legislation that has drawn the military into a leading role. Critics of military involvement claim that Congress and the administration are giving in to a "great drug hysteria, posturing" and have done nothing for education or for stopping domestic demand.[20]

National Drug Strategy

In response to legislation from Congress, the President created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The ONDCP was tasked to develop the national drug strategy, to manage and program a budget, and to coordinate and oversee all of anti-drug activities. It is responsible for policy, not for operational direction or command. After analyzing the drug problem, the ONDCP arrived at the same conclusion that many sociologists, educators, criminologists and military experts had

arrived at previously. That conclusion is that there is no single solution for the drug problem in the United States. So in the development of courses of action a broad, multidimensional strategy has emerged. This strategy is designed to attack all symptoms of the drug abuse problem simultaneously through education, treatment, interdiction, criminal justice, and international cooperation.[21]

The methodology for executing this national strategy is to attack all five of these elements with equal pressure and priority (or better stated, with no established priority.) Conceptionally, this pressure applied on all fronts concurrently will, over time, prevail.

The first two elements of this strategy are education and treatment. These require massive funding and the building of an infrastructure of trained personnel and of drug treatment facilities. The issue of user accountability links these two elements with attempts to enhance the capabilities of the criminal justice system. This enhancement includes court and prison expansion and expanding the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to fight drug trafficking organizations. These efforts are designed primarily to attack the demand side of the drug abuse problem. Interdiction and international cooperation, on the other hand, target the supply side. Interdiction is intended to stop the flow of drugs in transit as it crosses the borders of the United States. International cooperation describes those actions designed to attack drugs in the source country and to provide assistance to foreign law

enforcement agencies in their struggle against drug organizations.

The ONDCP has had some success. It managed to convince the Bush administration to include counterdrug policy as an integral part of its overall foreign policy agenda. The ONDCP has overseen budget execution and insured mandated compliance with congressional guidance. Most importantly, as the central government bureaucracy responsible to the President, it has brought into focus a major problem area, it has developed a national strategy, and it has provided Congress with "someone they can hold accountable" for drug control.[22]

DoD Counternarcotics Strategy

What is the role for the U.S. military in counternarcotics operations? Do counterdrug operations constitute new tactics or new methods of operations, or are counterdrug activities only another category of Low Intensity Conflict? These are but a few of the questions with which military planners have grappled for the past two years.

The Fiscal Year 1989 National Defense Authorization Act tasked and funded DoD a number of drug interdiction and counterdrug activities. Congress made available $450,000,000 to carry out these tasks; and DoD was designated the "lead" agency for drug interdiction. It gave the Secretary the authority to approve the use of National Guard forces for domestic support. It further tasked him to report to Congress annually the status

on specific taskings within the legislation as well as detailing all DoD initiatives to comply with the law.[23]

President Bush issued his National Drug Control Strategy on September 5, 1989, and with the expected passage of the pending appropriation bill, Secretary Richard B. Cheney issued his guidance for DoD implementation of the President's strategy. Secretary Cheney outlined a three-phased concept designed to attack each phase of drug trafficking.[24] While his guidance describes separate phases, it is intended to be conducted simultaneously.

Phase one is to attack drugs at the source by providing assistance for nation building, operational support to host-country forces and cooperation with host-country forces to prevent drug exports. U.S. military forces are authorized to assist foreign forces in training, reconnaissance, command-and-control, planning, logistics, medical support and civic action. The military is authorized to provide this support to host-nation police forces. Prior to this, U.S. military forces were specifically prohibited from training police forces and were, except on a case-by-case exception basis, permitted to train only foreign military forces.

The responsibility for operations in phase one rests exclusively with the Unified Commands. United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has provided a coordination staff and given direction to the counternarcotics efforts in theater. SOUTHCOM has developed an Andean Ridge Counter Narcotics Strategy to provide a regional approach to drug source interdiction.

However, the operationalization of this strategy is done by drug task forces established by the individual ambassador or country team. There is little operational interface between countries. Rather, there is a reliance upon the stovepipe organizations that make up the country team task forces to pass information horizontally.

Attacking illicit drugs while in transit from the source country to the user in the United States constitutes phase two of the Secretary's strategy guidance. With priority to the Caribbean Sea and the southern border of the United States, DoD assets will undertake substantial efforts to interdict and deter the flow of drugs. In addition, DoD will take the lead as the single federal agency for detection and monitoring of drug traffic and to establish and coordinate a network for command, control, communications, and technical intelligence for all agencies involved in counternarcotic activities.

As in phase one operations, DoD has given the regional CINC's the responsibility to fight this part of the war. Unlike phase one, this phase is much more complicated, as smuggled drugs actually can cross up to four jurisdictional boundaries in transit. For instance, drugs are taken by air or by sea from Columbia's west coast out over the Pacific, north to intermediate stops in Central America, then on to major transshipment sites in Mexico. From Mexico, the cargo is infiltrated into the U.S. by a variety of air, ground and sea routes. While in transit, the drug smuggler crosses regional boundaries of Southern, Atlantic, Pacific and Forces Commands. In some cases it is possible for

the trafficker to enter and depart a single CINC's jurisdictional area several times before actually delivering the drugs to the streets of America. These phase one and phase two problems are further complicated by the jurisdictional boundaries imposed by the hundreds of civilian law enforcement agencies involved in counternarcotics operations within the borders of the U.S.

The third phase of the DoD strategy is to attack drug use and traffic inside the United States. This will be done by providing training to law enforcement agencies and by providing operational support from the National Guard. In order to concentrate on the drug problem, civilian law enforcement agencies are in need of significant infrastructure support. Both active and reserve components provide personnel and equipment to individual agencies as requested. On a case-by-case basis, personnel will be detailed to civilian agencies to assist them in their efforts.

Should the military do more? In analyzing the Secretary's guidance it is clear that even though DoD has expanded its role and has indeed accepted the lead for detection, monitoring and interdiction, Defense Department assets are in a supporting role to civilian and domestic law enforcement agencies.

USSOCOM's Role in Counternarcotics

Secretary Cheney tasked the Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified Commands to initiate programs to "elevate substantially the mission priority within their commands of actions to fight

illegal drugs."[25] USSOCOM is a Unified Command whose primary mission is to provide combat ready Special Operations Forces for rapid reinforcement of other war fighting CINCs.[26]

In its role as a supporting command, USSOCOM sees its job as a provider of personnel, equipment and training assets to the warfighting commands. Even though it has established a separate counternarcotics staff branch within the J-3 Directorate, USSOCOM believes that the support it provides for counterdrug operations is neither extraordinary nor different from any of its other missions in the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) segment of the operational continuum.[27]

Within the military, there is debate over whether or not counternarcotics should make up a separate doctrinal category within Low Intensity Conflict. USSOCOM's position is that counternarcotics operations fall very easily into the spectrum of LIC activities. Counternarcotics operations correspond to the definition of LIC, in that LIC is a "confrontation between contending groups below conventional war" involving competing principles while threatening the stability of established nations, and is waged by political, military, economic and informational means.[28]

Low Intensity Conflict is conceptionally divided into four operational categories. These categories are: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations. Each operational grouping is purposefully broad to allow for the many diverse types of operations that are short of conventional

war. LIC operations often fall within two or more of the categories.[29] This is the case with counternarcotic operations. Whether conducting security assistance, surveillance, gathering intelligence, conducting remote area operations, psychological operations or civic action projects in support of a country team or in providing assistance to other non-DoD agencies, counternarcotic operations are included in the established LIC operational categories.

While USSOCOM forces have not taken the lead in any specific counternarcotics operations, it has provided equipment and personnel to support all phases of the effort.[30] It has provided mobile training teams to train host country paramilitary police forces in source countries. This support includes training in basic military techniques such as patrolling, demolitions, communications, first aid and intelligence operations. USSOCOM forces have built military camps and established training programs in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. Related to operations directed at the "source" is the tactical training provided to agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) at Fort Benning, Georgia, by the Ranger Department. These agents then link up with source-nation counternarcotic forces and conduct tactical operations designed to attack coca growers and cocaine production laboratories.

Additionally, SOF elements augment both the country team and the theater with enhanced intelligence capabilities and planners. In deference to host country sensibilities and likely U.S. Congressional concerns, Special Operations Forces are

prohibited from participating in actual operations.[31] These legislative restrictions do permit SOF to provide communications and medical support to DEA and other U.S. agencies on a by-request basis.

USSOCOM normally provides these forces to the theater commander, as in the case with USSOUTHCOM, who in turn provides operational guidance and control over the SOF elements once they are deployed. While this is a standard command and support arrangement for SOF employed in phase one, support for phase two "in transit" operations and for the phase three element within the borders of the United States are a bit more improvised.

Support is also provided to CINCFOR, CINCPAC and CINCLANT. USFORSCOM is tasked with the responsibility for protecting the borders of the United States. Even though it is responsible for coordinating all DoD support in CONUS, major counternarcotics joint task forces have been created that have the authority to separately coordinate military support. JTF 4 at Key West Florida, is subordinate to LANTCOM and is responsible for Florida, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. JTF 5 at Alamed, California, is responsible for the Pacific coast and reports to PACOM. JTF 6 at El Paso, Texas, was established by FORSCOM to coordinate the support for the southwest U.S. and Mexican border areas. A joint intelligence center also has been established in El Paso to collate, store, and disseminate drug intelligence. SOF supports all these operations, providing both equipment and the personnel to operate it, liaison and communications personnel for command-and-control, training for law enforcement agencies,

and reserve component SOF to conduct or facilitate ground operations.[32]

Requests for support come from many sources, including the DEA, FBI, local police and law enforcement agencies, numerous DoD agencies, the joint task forces, the unified commands, the services and from the joint staff. USSOCOM reviews all requests for its support to insure that the support requested is adequate, appropriate and legal.[33] It eliminates duplicate taskings and makes recommendations to the user on the best method of employing SOF assets for mission accomplishment.

Even with the limited nature of SOF support, there are certain risks involved. Of these, the risk of corruption within the ranks of SOF soldiers, sailors and airmen is the one which could have the most adverse impact on the entire Special Operations community. That SOF has so far escaped this pitfall, is by no means an indication that it is immune from danger. Highly-motivated, highly-trained special operations personnel are just as susceptible as the highly-motivated, highly-trained policemen, lawyers, judges, federal agents and elected officials who have fallen victim to the lure of the money that can be made in drug trafficking.

CAN SOF HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE DRUG PROBLEM?

In order for Special Operations Forces to have an impact on the drug abuse problem in the United States, it must act as

either a deterrent, be an active warfighter, or provide meaningful operational support to the warfighters.

Examples of using military force as a deterrent are difficult to find. The United States has arguably been able to prevent its foes from attacking either its economic or political interest by maintaining a strong military capability and by the threat of "overwhelming force." Likewise, since the end of World War II it has been able to deter nuclear war through a series of deterrence strategies such as "mutual assured destruction" or "massive retaliation." Deterrence strategy has been successful because it instilled fear or anxiety or doubt upon potential adversaries. In order for deterrence to work or to be a viable strategy it must strike some sense of terror into our enemies. By threatening the use of military force without having a real intention of using it, would be equivalent to making no threat at all. Simple posturing will have no impact at all.

Can Special Operations Forces stop or have any significant impact on drug trafficking in a warfighting role, or by providing support to the warfighters? The President, the Congress and the public seem to think so. President Bush made clear his rationale for committing military forces to the battle when he proclaimed that the transportation of drugs into this country "imposes exceptional costs on the economy of the United States, undermines our national values and institutions, and is directly responsible for the destruction and loss of many American lives," and constitutes a major threat to our national security.[34]

A policy declaration of strategic national interest such as the President's, make it imperative for the defense establishment to develop an appropriate supporting strategy. In its strategy formulation, DoD has developed the ways and USSOCOM has provided the means to assist in achieving that desired end-state or national interest. According to Secretary Cheney, that translates into the following military objective. He says that "the detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission."[35] The Secretary of Defense further stated that DoD "has a crucial role in defending the United States from the scourge of drugs."[36] No matter how strong the declarations and threats, without action, are still posturing and deter nothing.

In spite of claims to the contrary, SOF and DoD efforts in general have not been very successful. Since President Reagan declared the latest war on drugs, the military's efforts have been hindered by its own reluctance and limited by unclear guidance. Support prior to 1988 was limited to reacting to requests for support and training from law enforcement agencies. After being designated the "lead" federal agency for drug interdiction and responsible for coordinating command-and-control, communications and intelligence, contributions by the armed services and by SOF have increased significantly.[37] However, its role has changed little.

To date, USSOCOM has been unable to develop meaningful statistical data that would support any claims as to its effectiveness as a deterrent. Because it is in a supporting

role, all successes are attributed to other CINC's or law enforcement agencies. In order to demonstrate some degree of effectiveness, USSOCOM has relied upon calculating or quantifying its contributions in terms of money or mandays expended.

DoD claimed to have expended $91.3 million in 1987 for drug interdiction. This was largely for limited surveillance support, but did include some security assistance that was loosely attributed to the effort.[38] That figure rose sharply in 1989 and ballooned to a programmed $4.2 billion combined military and economic aid package over the next five years.[39] Levels of fiscal expenditure are the only measurement that the military can show that indicate its level of involvement. However, if the supply of drugs and the demand for drugs are used as measurements of effectiveness, then it does not paint a very good picture.

While expenditures in both money and manpower have increased dramatically, it would appear to be having little effect on the availability and use of drugs. Lately it has become popular for law enforcement agencies and politicians to redefine the elements of success in the war on drugs. Statements about the potential of drug eradication are more pessimistic. Notwithstanding some selective statistics, such as a reported drop in cocaine-related emergency hospital admissions (accidental overdoses), the fact remains that there has been a dramatic increase in coca leaf harvests by South American producers and a tremendous explosion in cocaine production.[40]

The supply of cocaine is so great that there is actually a glut on the streets.[41] Quality as well as quantity are up, and

the price is down. This massive amount of drug traffic has already caused the Administration to step back from its previous hard line and to reassess its ability to win the drug war. Current government goals are to "disrupt" international trafficking, attack the drugs at the source and "damage" the trafficking organizations. Even after threatening producing countries of the Andean Ridge with a reduction in foreign aid, the U.S. government has yet to penalize the first one in spite of the increased production and export of cocaine. Peru, in fact has rejected U.S. security assistance and temporarily terminated established SOF counternarcotic training programs in the Huallaga Valley.[42]

Through security assistance, SOF has had some success in its nation-building efforts. While these efforts have been successful in training, equipping and to some degree motivating foreign nations to engage in the drug war, there is little evidence that any of these efforts have had any direct impact on drug trade or more importantly, on drug use. Every success at interdiction is quickly offset by the drug traffickers simply shifting to new infiltration routes or to changing their operational methodology.[43] There has still not been an organization established to coordinate and control regional operations.[44]

To date, SOF combat forces have not been unilaterally used or committed to the war, even though there is clearly a role for them. General Colin Powell believes that combat forces could be used in strikes against South American drug cartels if the

traffickers attack Americans. Further, he believes that U.S. forces could assist other nations in missions "beyond the capability of the forces of the country concerned."[45] The unilateral use of Special Operations Forces would demonstrate a serious intent on the part of the U.S. to not only fight this war, but to win it as well. The problem for the military is that this is an unconventional conflict. The dilemma for senior civilian and military leadership is that it is not prepared to support the tactical and doctrinal techniques needed to fight an adversary whose doctrine and tactics have few moral and ethical restraints.[46]

USSOCOM as well as Navy and Air Force efforts have greatly assisted law enforcement by collecting intelligence and surveillance data and facilitating search and seizure operations by providing transportation. Even with major contributions of technological support, less than 23% of the identified drug runners are caught. Along the same lines, hundreds of National Guardsmen, including Army Special Forces, assisted border patrol and U.S. Customs agents last year and worked more than 96,000 man-days. While SOF support has had a positive impact on the individual successes of these operations, it appears to be intercepting only a fraction of what is being sent.[47]

CONCLUSION:

A Focused Military Effort and a Stronger Role for USSOCOM.

The current role USSOCOM has assumed as a supporting CINC, while altogether appropriate, nevertheless leaves something to be desired. SOF soldiers, sailors and airmen are given missions in which they are expected to execute with initiative and ingenuity, to accept risk and to be audacious in their mission accomplishment. The troops accept these risks enthusiastically, believing that they can make a difference. They run the risks of physical danger, of personal hardship due to the often harsh living conditions and of long family separations and, a perhaps a greater risk, one of corruption within their ranks.

Current DoD involvement concentrates the drug war risks at the tactical level, with no risk incurred by the military departments or even at the theater operational level. In light of these dangers it would only seem fair that the military, as an institution, assume some risk for mission accomplishment. There is clearly a need for some organization to step forward and become an advocate for and a proponent of changes in the way counternarcotic activities are conducted. While there are already adequate DoD resources in terms of personnel, equipment and money dedicated to this mission, there are several actions needed that could enhance operations and increase the possibilities of success.

First of all, there must be some changes in the legal barriers confronting SOF and the rest of the military. Soldiers working with foreign forces in the jungles of Bolivia and Peru, sailors working with the Coast Guard in Florida and California, and National Guardsmen working the Mexican border must be given

full authority to search, seize and arrest. The restrictions in the Defense Authorization Act of 1989 must be repealed.

A system needs to be developed to protect SOF from the perils of corruption that infect the law enforcement agencies involved in the counternarcotics war. This could consist of some type of oversight element or it could be a system of internal review procedures that hold individuals accountable for their actions. It should be targeted at possible abuses stemming from the use and trafficking of drugs by Special Operations personnel. To be effective, the system needs to be open and have systematic procedures for checks and deterrents in place. The responsibilities of this element need to be known to all personnel engaged in counternarcotic operations. The system's disciplinary authority should be rigid, uncompromising and harsh.

In the area of security assistance, the SOF role must be expanded from simply training and equipping the source-nations' counterdrug forces. Stagnated, inefficient operations and host-country reluctance must be overcome. Efforts must include everything from advising, directing and assisting host nation forces, to conducting unilateral operations on high value targets. Overseas interdiction must include the use of military force to become a credible deterrent or it should be stopped completely. Current U.S. efforts are simply a minor harassment to the narcotics traffickers and pose only a peripheral threat to their major interests.

Intelligence operations must be expanded and include all agencies and services. Information must be shared and acted upon

jointly. Intelligence activities should not be limited to overseas activities alone, but include domestic operations too. The El Paso Intelligence Center already has the multi-agency representation and a communications network capable of performing a more encompassing role. Collection efforts need to be requirement-driven, and pro-active analysis needs to be conducted in order to support the operating agencies.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to operational effectiveness is the lack of a coherent command structure. The numerous military commands participating in counternarcotic operations only exacerbate an already inefficient system bogged down by the proliferation of independent civilian agencies conducting unilateral, uncoordinated operations. The integration of military assets, personnel and technology must be fused into a single command. No such organization exists that can bring the military's efforts into focus. This lack of focus and the lack of unity of effort becomes increasingly more apparent as the military expands its support. USSOCOM could provide this structural void in the form of a "sub-unified" command that would report to a single commander. At a minimum, the standing counternarcotics task forces would be under its direct control as well as any other military organization that is tasked to perform counternarcotics operations. This command could be subordinate to or under the direct control of a civilian law enforcement agency, the Office of National Drug Control Policy or a single, designated unified command. Along with this "national military counternarcotics" organization, a similar regional command-and-

control structure needs to be established overseas. Once again, this structure would be subordinate to a single Unified Command which would have the authority to command, control and coordinate all counternarcotics
operations from the source country to the border of the United States, regardless of regional or jurisdictional boundaries.

While these recommendations may be seen as extreme, the alternative is to pay heed to Weinberger's warning and get out of civilian law enforcement all together. Several key issues remain unanswered by senior civilian leadership. Do we really want to commit the military and its resources to fight the drug war? If so, then the shackles must be removed from the operators and the mission and the responsibility for its accomplishment must be given to a single commander. At the present time, USSOCOM is neither in nor out of the war on drugs. If SOF is committed to the war, then it should be committed to win. Gradual or incremental increases in USSOCOM support have done little toward accomplishing our national interest - stopping illegal drug use by Americans. This has to be the bottom line objective of military support. The military should not become merely a substitute for infrastructure shortfalls in civilian law enforcement agencies. If DoD and USSOCOM are truly committed to winning the war on drugs, then they must be willing to commit themselves and not just their soldiers. If we do anything less, then the use of SOF in drug law enforcement is not justified.

ENDNOTES

1. Susan F. Rasky, "Senate Votes 83-6 to give Military Anti Drug Powers: Big Expansion of Role." New York Times, 14 May 1988, p. 1.

2. Hal Straus, "From Crack to Ecstasy," American Health Magazine, June 1987, p. 50.

3. Dan Hurley, "Cycles of Craving," Psychology Today, July/August 1989, pp. 50,51.

4. Michael Massing, "Cracks Destructive Sprint Across America," New York Times Magazine, 1 October 1989, p. 40.

5. Ethan A. Nadelmann, "The Case for Legalization." The Public Interest, No. 92, Summer 1988, pp. 16,17.

6. John Kaplow, "Taking Drugs Seriously." The Public Interest, Summer 1988, No. 92, p. 43.

7. Guest Speaker, Army War College, 1990. Non-attribution policy precludes identification.

8. Arnold Trebach, "Why not Decriminalize?" New Prospectives Quarterly, Summer 1989, p. 40.

9. "Reluctant Recruits: Drugs and the Military." Newsweek, Vol. 108, 28 July 1986, p. 30.

10. Michael H. Abbott, U.S. Army Involvement in Counterdrug Operations: a Matter of Politics or National Security. pp. 7,8.

11. U.S. Congress, Public Law 97-86, 1 December 1981, Congressional and Administrative News, 97th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 1, pp. 1115.

12. Ibid., p. 1116.

13. U.S. Congress, Public Law 101-189, 29 November 1989, Congressional and Administrative News, 101st Congress, 1st Session,Vol. 1, pp. 1562,1563.

14. Ibid. p. 1565.

15. James A Cathcart, And that goes for Domestic Wars Too! Study Project, U.S. Army War College, 13 March 1989, pp. 19-23.

16. Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," Defense '85, pp.2-11.

17. U.S. Department of the Army, "The Army's Role in Counternarcotics," Army Focus, November 1989, p. 29.

18. Caspar W. Weinberger, "Our Troops Shouldn't Be Drug Cops," Washington Post, 22 May 1988, p. C2.

19. Ibid.

20. Rasky, p. 54.

21. John Shkor, "The DoD Role in the War on Drugs," SO/LIC News, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 5,6.

22. Ibid.

23. Public Law 101-189, pp. 1562, 1563.

24. Richard B. Cheney, Department of Defense Guidance for the Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy, 18 September 1989, pp. 1-5.

25. Ibid., p. 4.

26. James J. Lindsey, "USSOCOM: Strengthening the SOF Capability," Special Warfare, Spring 1989, p. 4.

27. Interview with Peter Valco, Lcdr, USN, Chief, Counternarcotics Branch, United States Special Operations Command, McDill AFB, FL, 14 November 1990. Quoted by permission.

28. U. S. Department of the Army, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, FM 100-20, 1 December 1989, pp. v-vi.

29. Ibid., pp. 1-10, 1-11, 1-12.

30. Interview, Valco.

31. James Kitfield, "Drugs: The Military's New Unwinnable War," Government Executive, Vol. 22, March 1990, p.

32. Ibid.

33. Interview, Valco.

34. National Security Strategy of the United States

35. Secretary of Defense Letter p 1.

36. ibid., p. 5.

37. Shkor, p. 5.

38. George C. Wilson and Molly Moore, "Pentagon Warns of No-Win Mission," Washington Post, 13 May 1988, p. C2.

39. Shkor, p. 4.

40. Elaine Sciolino, "World Drug Crop Up Sharply in 1989 Despite U.S. Efforts," New York Times, 2 March 1990, p. 1.

41. Nadelmann, pp. 5, 6.

42. Melvyn Levitsky, "The Andean Strategy to Control Cocaine," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, July, 1990, p. 3.

43. James Kitfield, "Drugs: The Military's New Unwinnable War," Government Executive, Vol. 22, March 1990, p. 11.

44. Mark L. Goldstein, "Drug Wars, Turf Wars," Government Executive, January 1990, pp. 22, 25.

45. Kitfield, p. 13.

46. Sam C. Sarkesian, U.S. National Security, Policymakers, Processes, and Politics, pp. 33-37.

47. J. Paul Scicchitano, "Vietnam ghosts haunt soldiers in drug fight," Army Times, 2 October 1989, pp. 18, 21.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1973.

Sarkesian, Sam C. U.S. National Security, Policymakers, Processes, and Politics. Bolder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1989.

Journals

Bagley, Bruce M. "The New Hundred Years War." Journal of American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 30, Spring 1988, pp. 161-182.

Burlage, John. "Study Opposes Bigger Military Role in Drug War." Army Times, 13 June 1989, p. 10.

Kaplan, John. "Taking Drugs Seriosly." The Public Interest, Summer 1988, No. 92, pp. 32-50.

Maze, Rick, and Budahn, P. J. "Weinberger: Proposed Drug Role 'absurd." Air Force Times. 29 September 1986, p.3.

Musto, David F. "America's First Cocaine Epidemic." The Wilson Quarterly, Summer 1989, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 59-64.

Nadelmann, Ethan A. "The Case for Legalization." The Public Interest, No. 92, Summer 1988, pp, 3-31.

Scicchitano, J. Paul. "Vietnam Ghosts Haunt Soldiers in Drug Fight." Army Times, 2 October 1989, p. 18.

Shkor, John. "The DoD Role in the War on Drugs." SO/LIC News, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1990.

Magazines

Baker, Caleb. "DoD Seeks Approval for Large Military Role in Drug War." Defense News, 18 December 1989, p. 12.

Cheney, Richard B. "DoD and its Role in the War Against Drugs." Defense, November-December 1989, pp. 2-7.

Diegmueller, Karen. "Passing a Legacy of Drug Addition." Insight, 4 September 1989, pp. 22-23.

Gallagher, Winifred. "Marijuana: Is There New Reason to Worry?" American Health Magazine, March 1988, pp. 92-94, 98-100, 102-104.

Goldstein, Mark L. "Drug Wars, Turf Wars," Government Executive, January 1990, pp. 22-28.

Hurley, Dan. "Cycles of Craving." Psychology Today, July/August 1989, pp. 54-58.

Kitfield, James "Drugs: The Military's New Unwinnable War." Government Executive, March 1990, pp. 10-14.

Kolton, Randy J. "Combating the Colombian Drug Cartels." Military Review, March 1990.

Lindsey, James J. "USSOCOM: Strengthening the SOF Capability." Special Warfare, Spring 1989, p. 4.

Massing, Michael. "Cracks Destructive Sprint Across." New York Times Magazine, 1 October 1989, pp. 38, 40-41, 48, 60, 62.

"Reluctant Recruits: Drugs and the Military." Newsweek, Vol. 108, 28 July 1986, pp. 30-31.

Straus, Hal. "From Crack to Ecstasy." American Health Magazine, June 1987, pp. 50-52.

Trebach, Arnold. "Why Not Decriminalize?" New Prospectives Quarterly, Summer 1989, pp. 40-44.

Weinberger, Caspar W. "The Uses of Military Power." Defense '85, January 1985, pp. 2-11.

Newspapers

Dewar, Helen. "Senate Debates Expanding Military's Antidrug Role." Washington Post, 13 May 1988, p. A4.

Rasky, Susan F. "Senate Votes 83-6 to give Military Anti Drug Powers: Big Expansion of Role." New York Times, 14 May 1988, pp. 1, 54.

Sciolino, Elaine. "World Drug Crop Up Sharply in 1989 Despite U.S. Efforts." New York Times, 2 March 1990, pp. A1-A2.

Weinberger, Caspar W. "Our Troops Shouldn't Be Drug Cops." Washington Post, 22 May 1988, p. c-2.

Wilson, George C. "Experts Doubt Military Can Stop Flow of Drugs." Washington Post, 6 September 1989, p. A19.

Wilson, George C. and Moore, Molly. "Pentagon Warns of No-Win Mission." Washington Post, 13 May 1988, p. C2.

Reference Works

Abbott, Michael H. U.S. Army Involvement in Counterdrug Operations: a Matter of Politics or National Security. Study Project, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College 11 December 1989. (AD-A191-514)

Cathcart, James A. And that goes for Domestic Wars Too! Study Project, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 13 March 1989. (AD-A208-650)

Raines, Virgil E. Criteria For Success In The War On Drugs, Study Project, 31 March 1989. (9AD-A209-809)

Reuter, Peter. "Eternal Hope: America's International Narcotics Efforts." The Rand Corporation. February 1985. (HV 8079-N3R48)

Reuter, Peter. "Quantity Illusions and Paradoxes of Drug Interdiction: Federal Intervention into Vice Policy." The Rand Corporation, April 1987. (HV 8079-N3R46)

Public Documents

Levitshy, Melvyn. "The Andean Strategy to Control Cocaine." U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, July 1990.

Surrett, Roy. "The Defense Department's Drug Law Enforcement and Narcotics Interdiction Responsibilities." Congressional Research Service. 3 June 1988.

Taft, William H. IV. Memorandum, Office, Secretary of Defense, Policy Guidelines For Implementation of FY 1989 Congressionally Mandated Counter-Drug Responsibilities. Washington, DC: 6 January 1989, pp 1-c3.

U. S. Congress. Public Law 97-86, 1 December 1981, Congressional And Administrative News, 97th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 1, 1981, pp. 1114-1116.

U. S. Congress. Public Law 101-189, 29 November 1989. Congressional and Administrative News. 1st Session, Vol. 1, 1989, pp. 1562-1569.

U. S. Department of the Army. "The Army's Role in Counter Narcotics." Army Focus, November 1989, p. 29.

U. S. Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy, 18 September 1989.

The White House. National Drug Control Strategy, January 1990.

The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States, March 1990.

Non-Print Sources

Valco, Peter, Lcdr, USN, Branch Chief, Counternarcotics Branch, United States Special Operations Command, McDill AFB, FL. Interview, 14 November 1990.